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Summary
A growing body of research exists on democratic accountability. Much of this 
research focuses on citizen strategies for expressing their views, and on efforts 
to hold politicians and government service providers accountable. Despite this 
research, we in fact know little about how politicians in young democracies view 
these aspects of democratic governance. 
Given that accountability can be understood as a feedback ‘loop’ between citizens 
and elected representatives, it is necessary to gain a better understanding of the 
norms and values of politicians themselves, the pressures they face and the ways 
that they communicate with their constituents. 
This report details findings from an original survey of approximately 1,000 
South African councillors in 2016 and 2017 to explore what representation and 
accountability looks like from their perspective. How do they understand the 
various links in the accountability chain, including citizen input and deliberation, 
norms of good government and pressures from political parties, friends and 
family? The quality of democratic accountability, and the success of interventions 
to improve citizen representation, may depend on the norms and beliefs held by 
elected representatives.
Our findings are that even in a political context defined by strong parties, the 
descriptive representation of South African politicians has important substantive 
implications. Individual-level characteristics such as the race, gender, wealth and 
age of councillors meaningfully predict attitudes and perceptions on a range of 
important questions about voice and accountability. 
Practically, this suggests that citizens and civil society actors ought to recognise 
that individual politicians are likely to process information and take action in a 
manner that is strongly mediated by their own characteristics, social networks 
and life experiences. Just as sophisticated politicians will target their messages to 
different groups of voters, our findings suggest that citizens and civil society actors 
should target their messages to politicians in ways that are most likely to resonate.
We conclude that greater sensitivity to politicians’ perspectives may serve to 
enhance efforts to improve social accountability more generally. Theories and 
practice of social accountability should also pay greater attention to elected and 
non-elected actors as human individuals, shaped by life histories and the same 
types of cognitive and social biases that seem to constrain just about all of us.
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Introduction and context
In democratic contexts, the concept of accountability 
generally connotes a set of expectations held by 
citizens about the proper behaviour of elected 
government officials. Politicians are expected to be 
willing to inform the public about their actions and 
responsibilities, to listen to the demands and views of 
constituents, and to accept blame or punishment when 
they have not performed well – especially if they have 
violated existing norms and laws. Perhaps more than 
ever before, non-governmental organisations, anti-
corruption watchdogs and grass-roots civil society 
activists around the globe are launching campaigns 
aimed at enhancing accountability by pressuring 
government officials to live up to these standards. 
Despite a great deal of scholarly and policy-oriented 
research in recent years around how citizens can improve 
accountability among government officials, we know 
surprisingly little about how elected representatives 
themselves actually perceive their jobs and pressures, 
and what representation and accountability looks like 
from their vantage point. How do politicians understand 
the various links in the accountability chain, including 
citizen input and deliberation, norms of good government 
and pressures from other actors such as parties, 
friends and family? Under what conditions do these 
perceptions align with (or diverge from) the model of 
accountability promoted by citizens, activists and civil 
society organisations? These questions are important 
because the quality of democratic accountability, as 
well as the success of interventions to improve the 
representation of citizen voices, may well depend on 
the norms and beliefs held by elected representatives. 
In this report, we study these questions using an 
original survey of local politicians in contemporary 
South Africa. We seek to ‘open the black box’ around 
elected representatives by exploring the views 
and experiences of individual politicians in South 
Africa’s local governments. We follow the insight 
of Grandvoinnet, Aslam and Raha (2015: 6), who 
highlight that, “within the state, elected and nonelected 
officials respond to different sets of incentives and 
might have divergent attitudes toward fostering or 
responding to social accountability”. We pursue this 
hypothesis, and specifically seek to theorise about and 
empirically examine why some politicians are more 
inclined to listen to citizens, and to represent and act 
on their interests. What are the pressures they face? 
How do they communicate? Why do some embrace 
norms of accountability while others do not? 
Learning about politicians’ perspectives should 
contribute to broader understandings of which 
strategies might be effective for holding politicians 
accountable and to improve the quality of democratic 
governance. Like the citizens they are supposed 
to represent, South African politicians are diverse 
across many dimensions, including race, class, 
gender and age. In this report, we show that even 
within the ‘black box’ of government, these traits 
are meaningful predictors of individual views. In 
other words, our findings suggest that descriptive 
representation has important substantive 
implications. More practically, this implies that when 
interacting with local elected officials, citizens and 
organised actors from civil society ought to recognise 
that individual politicians are likely to process 
information and to take actions in a manner that is 
strongly mediated by their own characteristics, social 
networks and life experiences. Just as sophisticated 
politicians will target their messages to different 
groups of voters, our findings suggest that citizens 
and civil society actors should target their messages 
in ways that are most likely to resonate.
More generally, our research seeks to contribute to 
the burgeoning literature on ‘social accountability’ 
(e.g. Grandvoinnet et al. 2015; as reviewed by Joshi 
2013; Fox 2015; World Bank 2016; and summarised 
in McGee, Edwards, Minkley, Pegus and Brock 2015). 
To date, this literature offers few clear success stories, 
but rather warns that researchers should not take 
for granted how actors will respond to and coalesce 
around particular campaigns. Grandvoinnet et al. 
(2015: 37–8) highlight that “Social accountability 
[SA] results from the interplay of state action and 
citizen action” and go on to argue that, “the drivers 
of state action have not been an adequate focus of 
SA mechanisms, even though the role of the state is 
Despite a great deal of scholarly and policy-oriented research in recent 
years around how citizens can improve accountability among government 
officials, we know surprisingly little about how elected representatives 
themselves actually perceive their jobs and pressures, and what 
representation and accountability looks like from their vantage point.
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pivotal to the concept of SA”.1 We attempt to take 
these lessons and concerns seriously, and our work 
may eventually help to identify the conditions under 
which social accountability mechanisms can operate 
in normatively desirable ways. Within the social 
accountability literature, we see a large gap in terms 
of illuminating the opinions, attitudes, mechanisms of 
information processing and behaviours of politicians 
themselves, particularly in the African context.2 We 
proceed with the understanding that the views of 
elected leaders about what issues are important, 
what actions are right or wrong, and what role citizen 
participation ought to play, are central in ultimately 
shaping policy outcomes and levels of engagement. In 
order to understand how and why citizens are more or 
less effective in their efforts to benefit from democratic 
government, we need a better understanding of the 
motivations and perspectives of elected politicians.
South Africa is a country in which questions of 
accountability, politician performance and service 
delivery have become particularly salient. Indeed, 
virtually each day, the news media reports on 
corruption scandals at all levels of South Africa’s 
government, complaints about the quality of 
governance and sometimes violent protests against 
inadequate service delivery – a term that connotes 
myriad frustrations. While one could lament this as 
evidence of the failures of democratic accountability, 
the high volume of citizen mobilisation aimed at 
sanctioning poor government performance also 
reveals strong accountability processes in action. 
Since its first multi-racial election in 1994, South Africa 
has been heralded as one of the world’s more robust 
democracies, hosting a series of free and fair elections 
at the national, provincial and local levels. The country’s 
constitution is one of the most progressive in the world, 
as demonstrated at least in part by the enumeration of 
a series of social and economic rights. A vibrant media 
landscape transmits the news in multiple languages 
and modalities, and a strong network of civil society 
organisations operates throughout the country.
South Africa’s local government sphere in particular 
was intended to be a site of participatory governance. 
With this goal in mind, the government mandated 
the creation of ‘ward committees’ (Piper and Deacon 
2009) to be convened by ward councillors in the 
4,000-plus wards (currently) within the country’s 
eight metropolitan municipalities and 226 local 
municipalities, and a set of procedures for community 
participation in budgeting and priority-setting through 
the development of Integrated Development Plans 
(IDPs). Given a long history of grass-roots activism 
and engagement, and deliberate constitutional 
planning for accountable government, South Africa 
is therefore arguably a ‘most likely’ case for finding 
engaged citizens and responsive politicians. Indeed, 
millions of South Africans have gained access to 
better services since the end of apartheid.
However, for many observers, democratic hopes, including 
for local government, have turned to disappointment 
(Alexander 2010; Siddle and Koelble 2012). A legacy 
of apartheid has left the country burdened with 
profound inequalities of income, wealth and opportunity 
particularly along racial lines, but also along other 
dimensions, including gender and space (urban–rural). 
In fact, the reality of democratic governance is quite 
varied across the country, and demands more nuanced 
analysis. To date, the vast majority of studies of South 
African local governance have been focused on the macro 
level, often making general conclusions rather than 
seeking to explain variation across contexts. For example, 
Piper and Deacon (2009) draw conclusions about the 
failings of local governance based on a study of Msunduzi 
municipality. Alexander (2010) and Booysen (2007) 
highlight broad trends in protests and service delivery 
across municipalities, noting key changes in state–society 
relations. But such studies either draw on selective 
accounts of a few politicians, or simply discuss politicians 
in aggregate, sometimes as ‘government’ or ‘the state’. 
While understandable as the entry-point for raising 
some of the key issues in local democratic governance, 
such approaches do not explore heterogeneous 
preferences and motivations among government actors. 
In the long term, we seek to develop a fuller 
understanding of local government accountability 
through a panel study of municipal councillors, 
beginning with the councils elected in the August 3, 
2016 elections. This election proved to be the most 
competitive in South Africa’s modern democratic history 
and led to important transfers of power away from the 
dominant African National Congress (ANC), in favour of 
the main challenger, the Democratic Alliance (DA) party, 
and to a lesser degree, an emergent Economic Freedom 
Fighters (EFF) party. Whereas the DA was once viewed 
as an almost exclusively ‘white’ and ‘coloured’ party 
– to use the unavoidable race categories employed 
in the South African context – the political landscape 
has shifted with many black South Africans now voting 
for and serving in leadership positions in the DA. 
Meanwhile, the ANC’s support among an already small 
share of non-black voters has diminished substantially. 
South Africa’s particular history of institutionalised 
1 We adopt this definition of social accountability, which is slightly different from Joshi’s (2013), as the latter makes a distinction 
between social accountability and political accountability, which we do not. Irrespective of the term used, our focus is on 
accountability with respect to elected politicians.
2 One exception is the African Legislators’ Project, which has surveyed several dozen high-level legislators in various African countries 
– but this is simply a cross-sectional attitudinal survey, and is not designed to assess particular causal theories of accountability.
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white supremacy and racial apartheid polarised 
voters and parties along racial lines – but the overlap 
between party and race is not complete and we seek 
to identify the areas in which one trumps the other.
This report details the findings from a baseline survey, 
which forms just one component of a larger research 
project3 that will be ongoing at least until the next set 
of local government elections. The survey, carried out 
between November 2016 and August 2017, included 
approximately 1,000 South African local councillors in 
21 municipalities. While this study covers just a single 
country case, and at the moment a snapshot in time, 
such research begins to tease out the accountability 
chain and provides new insights about the individual 
perspectives of local politicians.
We detail two sets of findings in this paper:
1. We describe the background characteristics of the 
local councillors surveyed, including the breakdown 
in terms of race, gender, level of education and 
wealth, and the communications tools they use. 
Such information is surprisingly unavailable – 
certainly to the public and to multiple municipalities. 
We begin to fill this gap by providing a basic portrait 
of the demographics of this critical group of elected 
representatives and, where possible, we compare 
this portrait to that of the demographics of the 
municipalities they were elected to represent.
2. We detail the responses of councillors to a range 
of survey questions concerning their views 
about their jobs, responsibilities and the role of 
citizen input versus party pressures. In certain 
cases, we demonstrate high levels of consensus 
around particular views and values. Where there 
is greater variation, we explore which councillor 
characteristics consistently predict various answers, 
holding other factors constant. We find that even 
once we control for party affiliation, councillors’ 
race, gender, wealth, education level and age are all 
important predictors of their responses, highlighting 
that even in a strong party system, councillors bring 
their own life histories to their jobs. 
Methods (plans and the realities of 
data collection)
Our population of interest is elected South African 
local municipal councillors in urban and near-urban 
areas. This includes councillors elected through 
both proportional representation (PR) and single-
member district (ward) rules in all eight major 
metropolitan municipalities, and in 13 adjacent ‘local 
municipalities’ (see Appendix, p.22).
Our initial plan was to field a baseline survey 
approximately two months after the 2016 local elections. 
We hired a survey firm, Ipsos, to conduct this part of 
the study. The protocol was to make appointments with 
municipal managers and arrange to have an enumeration 
team attend a full council meeting. We expected that 
most councillors would complete the 15-minute 
survey via self-administration using either their own 
smartphones or tablets that would be made available to 
them. Councillors would also have the option to complete 
the survey with pen and paper, or through face-to-face 
enumeration. We had planned for enumeration to last 
for approximately two to three months.
South Africa’s 2016 local elections proved to be 
exciting, competitive and, in many cases, violent 
and combative; and these dynamics carried over 
into the start of the council terms. In such an 
environment, even a professionally implemented, 
confidential survey was not likely to be received as 
a ‘neutral’ endeavour. First, it took several weeks for 
some councils to be seated, owing to the need for 
the formation of coalition governments. Moreover, 
violence within councils – that is, literal physical 
fighting between elected councillors – further delayed 
our research. Tensions within councils also made it 
difficult to secure appointments. 
After several months of attempting data collection with 
only limited success, we set out to approach councillors 
with a different format – computer-assisted face-to-
face interviews – that proved more successful. We 
engaged the survey firm Plus94 to conduct this work. 
While falling short of our original goal of obtaining a 
near-census of councillors in our subject municipalities, 
our final sample of 1,032 councillors contains a 
diverse group from the eight urban municipalities 
and 13 near-urban local municipalities from which it 
was drawn, and is sufficient to meaningfully explore 
variation across councillors and localities.
The main implication for our study is that our 
respondents are those who were willing to talk to a 
survey enumerator, to share their views with some 
3 Additional ongoing and planned research includes qualitative research about particular councillors; tracking and analysis of 
budgetary and administrative data; event-tracking through various media sources; and experimental research.
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degree of trust that they would not be used as part 
of a political smear campaign or in some other 
detrimental manner. We cannot say very much about 
the (approximate) 50 per cent of councillors in our 
targeted municipalities who did not participate in our 
survey, except for the fact that local government, 
like other spheres of government in contemporary 
South Africa, is characterised by large portions of 
representatives who are difficult to contact, and who 
sometimes resist communication and transparency. Of 
course, we cannot over-interpret non-responses to a 
survey: busy and productive councillors may refuse to 
participate simply due to time constraints, and they may 
not see much value to themselves or their constituents 
in participating. But in a great many cases, our non-
responses reflect difficulties in simply contacting 
councillors and broken promises to complete the survey.
Despite these limitations, we believe that our sample is 
an important one substantively, and reflects the lived 
reality that many councillors are not likely to respond 
to external queries.
Findings
In our analyses, we consider the distribution of 
councillor responses to questions related to citizen voice 
and accountability. Are there areas in which there is a 
strong consensus among councillors? Where there is 
variation, what are the best predictors of that variation? 
First, we identify the salient individual characteristics of 
councillors, and their distribution within the study. This 
helps to understand the extent to which our sample 
is representative of councillors in the councils from 
which we sampled; and representative of the broader 
population they represent. 
Subsequently, we examine whether these 
characteristics are themselves good predictors of 
councillors’ attitudes concerning key accountability 
processes and mechanisms. These analyses help us to 
distinguish the extent to which individual circumstance, 
party identification or (in future analyses) constituency 
characteristics are associated with certain responses.
A descriptive portrait of local 
councillors
Questions of representation have long been 
understood in terms of ‘descriptive’ and ‘substantive’ 
components (Pitkin 1967). The former references the 
degree of similarity between elected representatives 
and their constituents in terms of descriptive 
characteristics such as gender, race and socio-
economic status. The latter refers to the extent to 
which elected representatives advocate for particular 
policies that their constituents (or groups among their 
constituents) prefer. While these are distinct concepts, 
they are related when citizens’ preferences and 
interests are shaped by or correlated with descriptive 
characteristics. When this is the case, inequalities in 
descriptive representation – differences in terms of 
“lack of representation in political office on the basis 
of race, gender, class, ethnicity, disability” – may 
cause or perpetuate other forms of inequalities along 
these lines (Gaventa and Runciman 2016: 71).4 In 
other words, the extent to which elected leaders in 
South African local government appear similar to their 
constituents, in terms of important demographic and 
socio-economic characteristics, may be important in 
explaining policy outcomes.
The following are key demographic characteristics of 
our sample, compared (in some cases) to demographic 
characteristics of the study municipalities (also shown 
in Figures 1 to 3).
4 Regretfully, we did not ask any questions about disability on our survey.
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Figure 1
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Figure 2
Figure 3
Passed Matric
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• Approximately 72% of the respondents reported 
their party affiliation on the survey. Of that 
group, 48% of the responding councillors 
are from the dominant ANC party (which 
controlled 16 of the 21 study municipalities, 
and received 45% of the PR vote share in our 
study municipalities); 37% are from the DA 
party (which received 40% of the PR vote 
share); 5% from the EFF party (which received 
8% of the vote share); and the remainder of 
approximately 10% are from smaller parties or 
are independents (small parties received 6.8% of 
the PR vote share).
• In terms of self-identified racial categories, 67% 
identified as Black or African (as compared with 
72% as estimated for the citizenry in the study 
municipalities); 16% identified as white (compared 
with 16% among citizens); and 12% as coloured 
(11% of citizens).
• Within our sample, 38% of the councillors are 
female – which is clearly not representative of the 
overall population (in fact, 51% of South Africans 
are female).5 
• In terms of education, 53% of the councillors 
passed ‘matric’, South Africa’s standard exam 
for completing secondary school; and 19% of 
councillors have a university degree. Councillors 
are thus more educated than the general 
population, among whom less than 10% of those 
aged 20 and over reported having a Bachelor’s 
degree on the 2016 nationwide community survey.
• The average age of councillors in our sample is 
46 years. 
• In terms of wealth, we create a simple five-point 
index that sums the number of durable goods 
that the councillor reported owning (component 
parts are displayed in Figure 2): a car, a computer, 
a refrigerator and a satellite TV. While 53% of 
councillors report owning all four items, 5% report 
owning none; 5% report owning just one; 10% 
report owning two items; and 25% report owning 
three of the four items. 
• Moreover, 39% of councillors report that they 
had previously lived in an informal settlement, 
suggesting that a substantial portion of South 
Africa’s elected representatives have direct life 
experience with poverty. (Indeed, having lived in 
an informal settlement is a very strong negative 
predictor of current reported wealth.) 
• The distribution of councillors is fairly evenly 
balanced between major metropolitan areas 
(54%) and non-metro / local municipalities 
(46%).
• Figure 3 also displays the proportion of ward 
compared to PR councillors; and the share of 
councillors in the sample who hold leadership 
positions (mayor, speaker, member of mayoral 
committee (maycom), or party whip). 
In the analyses that follow, we consider the 
extent to which these characteristics account for 
other aspects of councillors’ reported behaviours 
and attitudes. To be certain, many of these 
characteristics are frequently correlated with 
one another – for instance, there are few white 
ANC councillors; and wealth and education are 
correlated. However, none of these factors are so 
strongly correlated that we cannot explore their 
associations independently.6 Throughout the report, 
we give estimates followed by the upper and lower 
bounds of 95% confidence intervals.
Modes of communication
Central to voice and accountability is communication 
and the flow of information. If citizens want to be 
heard, it is important to understand the channels 
that councillors use most frequently. Urban-based 
civil society organisations are increasingly using 
new forms of information and communications 
technology (ICT) to advance their agendas, but 
how likely is it that these will be heard by local 
councillors? In our survey, we asked councillors 
about their use of eight different modes. As 
displayed in Figure 4, they could report that they 
‘read, use or access’ each of those on a seven-point 
scale ranging from ‘never’ to ‘multiple times per 
day’. For most channels, the modal response was 
‘multiple times per day’, but clearly some channels 
are consulted more frequently than others. The 
vast majority of councillors report consulting the 
newspaper or radio at least once a week – though a 
small minority report that they rarely or never read 
the newspaper. 
5 Owing to the lack of availability of demographic information about councillors, we cannot yet determine whether this is 
because of actual imbalance in the gender representation of councils and / or because of a bias in who was willing to respond to 
our survey.
6 We use the variance inflation factors (VIF) from our models to check for potential multicollinearity. While certain variables such as 
party affiliation have VIFs greater than two – indicating some degree of correlation with other predictor variances – we find that 
none of the regressors has VIFs greater than three, indicating that multicollinearity is not a serious concern.
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Figure 4
Newspaper
Never Few/yr 1/month 1/week Few/week Daily Daily+
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
Phone
Never Few/yr 1/month 1/week Few/week Daily Daily+
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
Email
Never Few/yr 1/month 1/week Few/week Daily Daily+
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
Twitter
Never Few/yr 1/month 1/week Few/week Daily Daily+
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
Radio
Never Few/yr 1/month 1/week Few/week Daily Daily+
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
Web
Never Few/yr 1/month 1/week Few/week Daily Daily+
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
Facebook
Never Few/yr 1/month 1/week Few/week Daily Daily+
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
WhatsApp
Never Few/yr 1/month 1/week Few/week Daily Daily+
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
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Among digital channels, councillors use WhatsApp 
with the greatest frequency, with just 8% indicating 
that they never use that channel. At the opposite 
extreme, the majority of councillors ‘never’ consult 
Twitter. Separately, we create an indicator for 
frequency of use of digital communications across 
channels, summing the indicators for accessing 
the web, email, short messaging service (SMS), 
Facebook, Twitter and WhatsApp.
Our findings are clear: local councillors do 
not universally or consistently access digital 
communications. For example, we find, in line 
with conventional wisdom in South Africa, that 
ANC councillors use digital communications to a 
lesser extent than other parties, such as the DA. 
Holding other factors constant, ANC councillors 
are on average nearly 14 percentage points 
(–5%, –25%) less likely to be a ‘heavy digital 
user’ (defined as being in the top third of the 
digital communications index), and nearly 11 
percentage points (–2%, –23%) less likely to use 
Twitter, compared to members of other parties.7 
Meanwhile, wealth and university education are 
positive predictors of digital technology use: a 
one standard deviation increase in the wealth 
index is associated with a 3 percentage point 
increase (–1%, 8%) in the likelihood of being 
a heavy digital user, while having a university 
education is associated with a 10 percentage 
point increase. By contrast, a one standard 
deviation increase in age (approximately 10 
years) is associated with an 8 percentage point 
decrease (–5%, –12%) in the likelihood of being 
a heavy digital user. Black racial identity is also 
a negative – though insignificant – predictor of 
digital communications use.8 Finally, we see that 
councillors in major metropolitan municipalities 
are 9 percentage points (2%, 17%) more likely to 
be heavy digital users. These patterns generally 
hold even when looking only at sub-sets of ANC 
and DA councillors, highlighting the important 
ways in which personal characteristics shape how 
individual elected officials access information. To 
be clear, the point is not that black councillors or 
older councillors are not using digital technologies 
at all, but simply that, on average, they utilise fewer 
of these communications modalities and generally 
less frequently than white councillors and younger 
councillors. While one might expect that digital 
access will continue to increase, such findings do 
suggest that campaigns targeting councillors with 
ICTs may be more effective at reaching certain 
types of councillors than others.
Citizen voice and accountability
From the perspective of representation and 
accountability, a key concern is the extent to 
which councillors seek out and respect community 
participation and feedback. Williams (2006) for 
example, in a discussion of community participation 
in local governance in South Africa, argues that 
meaningful participation is quite limited, owing to the 
nature of strong party control of the political agenda, 
and careful management of how and on what issues 
citizens can actually participate.
What are councillors’ views about the role citizens 
ought to play in decision-making? To be sure, asking 
questions about this topic may generate responses 
that do not accurately reflect what councillors 
actually do in practice. In particular, such questions 
may be affected by social desirability bias. However, 
we developed questions that forced councillors to 
make trade-offs among priorities, and we believe 
that their answers can, at the very least, help shed 
light on how councillors perceive the role of citizen 
input in local government. 
Specifically, we asked councillors to choose between 
sets of statements, asking whether they agree ‘more’ 
or ‘much more’ with either statement. 
7 By contrast, ANC councillors are just as likely to be Facebook users as the members of other parties.
8 However, having a black racial identity is strongly and negatively associated with being a Facebook user, leading to a nearly 27 
percentage point decreased likelihood.
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find, in line with conventional wisdom in South Africa, that 
ANC councillors use digital communications to a lesser extent 
than other parties.
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As shown in Figure 5, the first set of statements 
asks them to identify their location on a perceived 
‘efficiency–participation’ continuum. The point is not 
to imply that these are a zero-sum game, i.e. that 
participation always imparts an efficiency loss, but 
to identify the extent to which politicians prioritise 
citizen input relative to other factors:
• Statement 1: It is more important to have a 
government that can get things done, even if 
citizens have little influence over what it does.
• Statement 2: It is more important for citizens to 
provide input, even if that means government 
makes decisions more slowly.
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Figure 6
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Second, as shown in Figure 6, we ask the councillors 
to recognise the trade-offs between listening to local 
constituents (voters) and party leaders. The point of 
this question is to recognise that councillors must 
balance between these two sets of ‘principals’:
• Statement 1: Because municipal councillors are 
elected by citizens, councillors should listen to their 
local constituents first and foremost
• Statement 2: Because the party makes important 
policy decisions, councillors should listen to party 
leaders first and foremost.
Thus, both questions provide councillors with an 
opportunity to choose a ‘listen to citizens’ response. 
In both cases, a majority of councillors selected that 
option. However, a full 32% of respondents opted 
for the ‘efficiency’ or ‘get things done’ value over 
citizen input; and 15% indicated, contrary to social 
expectations, that they need to listen to party leaders 
first and foremost.
Wealthier councillors are significantly more likely to 
say that they prioritise citizen input over efficiency: 
 a one standard deviation increase in the wealth 
index is associated with a 4 percentage point increase 
(1%, 7%) in the likelihood of agreeing either ‘more’ 
or ‘much more’ with Statement 2. ANC councillors are 
also more likely to respond in favour of citizen input, 
while EFF councillors are significantly more likely to 
favour ‘getting things done’ – a response that seems 
consistent with that party’s rhetoric, which emphasises 
the role of strong leadership. Moreover, ward 
councillors are significantly less likely to favour citizen 
input over ‘getting things done’ (–7%; –1%, –14%), 
compared to PR councillors. These patterns may be 
unsurprising, since ward councillors are more on the 
‘frontline’ of service delivery and may perceive that 
they will get more favourable feedback from citizens 
if they can deliver. Moreover, in many instances, 
they may feel overloaded by citizen input. Finally, 
while few variables significantly predict whether 
councillors will prioritise listening to constituents 
over listening to the party, older councillors are 
significantly more likely (3%; 0%, 6%) to agree 
‘more’ or ‘much more’ that constituents’ opinions 
should be prioritised.
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As Figure 7 shows, councillors also overwhelmingly 
(more than 95%) agree or strongly agree with the 
statement,
• In areas with service delivery protests, it is 
important to meet with the protesters and hear 
their grievances. 
This further reflects a perception – perhaps 
surprisingly widespread – among South African 
councillors that citizen input should play a central 
role in local governance. On the other hand, we had 
expected that more councillors would choose not to 
meet with protesters as a strategy to reduce their 
bargaining power. 
Efficacy / perceptions of influence
Do individual councillors believe that they can effect 
change? Do they view themselves as influential? Just 
as perceptions of efficacy have long been recognised 
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as important for political participation on the part 
of citizens (e.g. Finkel 1985), so too should we 
inquire about whether individual elected leaders 
perceive themselves to be efficacious. This should 
be of particular concern in a sample such as the one 
studied here: local government leaders may perceive 
themselves to be at the bottom of a governance 
pyramid and, among councillors, those who are not 
in leadership positions within the council may not 
see themselves as being able to contribute. In turn, 
it stands to reason that those who do not perceive 
themselves as influential may be substantially less 
likely to take action, which would be an important 
source of agency loss for citizens engaging with and 
making demands on such councillors.
We consider responses to three statements: 
• You have the opportunity to make your community 
a better place
• You are present when the most important decisions 
are made that affect your municipality
• You are able to influence the outcome of important 
decisions that affect your ward or community.
Councillors had five options in reaction to each 
statement – strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor 
disagree, disagree, strongly disagree. (This is the 
case for all statements considered in the remainder 
of this report.)
We find a high level of perceived efficacy in our sample. 
For the first statement, a full 94% agree with the 
statement, but, as shown in Figure 8, there was some 
variation in strength of sentiment. Responses to the 
second and third statements are highly correlated, 
and when compared with the first statement we find more 
variation in responses. Still, there is a strong consensus 
among councillors that they are both present for important 
decisions and can influence important decisions.
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Figure 8
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Interestingly, there were no significant differences 
between councillors of different parties. On the other 
hand, a councillor’s wealth is a consistent predictor 
of all three questions, a finding that is consistent with 
studies of citizens, which show higher efficacy among 
the wealthy (Brady, Verba and Schlozman 1995). For 
instance, a one standard deviation increase in wealth 
is associated with a 2 percentage point increase (1%, 
4%) in the likelihood that councillors either ‘agree’ 
or ‘strongly agree’ that they are able to influence the 
outcomes of important decisions. Moreover, black 
councillors are significantly more likely to perceive 
themselves as being influential, and were 11% (5%, 
19%) more likely to agree that they are able to influence 
important outcomes compared with councillors of other 
racial identities. These effects hold within both the 
ANC and the DA. While whites hold a disproportionate 
share of South Africa’s wealth relative to their 
numbers, within the political realm their minority 
status may lead them to perceive themselves as less 
influential in decision-making.
Councillors from parties in power and those in leadership 
positions are somewhat more likely to agree that 
they can influence outcomes. By contrast, university-
educated councillors are less likely to agree with this 
statement (–8%; –2%, –16%). This is a surprising 
result that demands some greater examination, as we 
generally expect more educated individuals to feel more 
efficacious. However, in South Africa’s political context 
university-educated individuals may perceive themselves 
to be more distant from the centre of political power 
and the majority of the population.
Finally, while female councillors are somewhat more 
optimistic about being able to make their community 
a ‘better place’, there appears to be no significant 
difference in their likelihood of feeling that they can 
influence important decisions.
Overall, these are important findings if one wants to 
understand how and why some councillors are more 
likely to take action, given their awareness of citizen 
wants and needs. Future research will need to examine 
the extent to which such feelings actually predict 
councillor behaviours and impact.
Job satisfaction / sense of respect
In a related manner, we might expect that those who feel 
that they are being treated poorly – either in terms of their 
compensation and professional development, or by the 
communities they serve – would be less likely to do their 
jobs well. They might feel a lesser obligation to respond to 
the demands of constituents or of party leaders, perhaps 
due to a sense of apathy or even antipathy. Conversely, 
councillors in this position might try harder to earn the 
respect of one or both of these ‘principals’. 
We report the distribution of responses to related 
questions in Figure 9. Councillors overwhelmingly 
responded that they agree with the statement, “You 
are learning new skills”, and there are no important 
differences in terms of councillor characteristics. 
However, there was somewhat less consensus among 
councillors that people in their communities respected 
their work. While 39% strongly agree, 51% merely 
agree with this statement, and 7% are neutral. In 
general, wealthier councillors perceived slightly more 
respect (a one standard deviation increase in the wealth 
index is associated with a 2 percentage points greater 
likelihood (1%, 4%) of agreeing or strongly agreeing 
that one’s work is respected) and women slightly 
(though not significantly) less. 
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Councillors from parties in power and those in leadership positions 
were somewhat more likely to agree that they can influence outcomes. 
Figure 9
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Interestingly, ruling party councillors and those in 
metropolitan municipalities perceive less respect (a 
decrease of approximately 2 percentage points in the 
likelihood of agreeing or strongly agreeing for both 
predictors), though the differences are not statistically 
significant. This may reflect a sense that ruling party 
politicians are ‘owed’ a degree of respect for their work 
that is not always reflected in reality, or that more is 
demanded of ruling party politicians. Indeed, public 
expressions of dissatisfaction are generally lobbied at 
those in power, rather than at opposition leaders.
In contrast to the previous two measures of 
job satisfaction, councillors vary widely in their 
assessment of the extent to which they said their pay 
was fair for their work. While 46% agree or strongly 
agree that the pay was fair, 42% disagree. The major 
sources of variation were whether the councillor was 
from a party in power (in which case they had a 13 
percentage point (5%, 21%) greater likelihood of 
responding ‘agree’ or ‘strongly agree’ that their pay was 
fair), and councillor type (ward v. PR). Ward councillors 
are 7 percentage points less likely (–0%, –14%) to 
report that their pay was fair, which is understandable 
given that the job of ward councillor, by all accounts, 
appears far more onerous than that of a PR councillor. 
Councillors with university degrees are somewhat less 
likely to agree that their pay is fair, while women are 
somewhat more likely (though not at significant levels) 
– both of which may reflect differing opportunity costs 
of a career in local government. 
Finally, most councillors perceive that the media 
treated them poorly, with 38% disagreeing and 14% 
strongly disagreeing with the statement, “The news 
media provides a fair portrait of local councillors in 
South Africa”. Councillors in leadership positions 
are  substantively and significantly less likely (–12%; 
–3%, –21%) to agree or strongly agree that the 
media treated them fairly. Older councillors, by 
contrast, are more likely to agree that the media was 
fair (3%; 0%, 7%). 
What sorts of pressures do 
councillors face?
Councillors face a range of pressures in their daily 
work and lives. In poorer South African communities, 
citizens may come to their ward councillor for a wide 
range of personal problems and concerns, often well 
beyond the scope of councillors’ job descriptions. 
While councillors’ willingness to help address 
constituents’ needs may be laudable in some cases, 
the integrity of a democratic government depends 
on those exchanges being made in a relatively 
transparent manner, without threat or intimidation, 
and without demands to grant special favours in a 
quid pro quo relationship. 
Of course, it is difficult to ask directly about the 
prevalence of corrupt practices and we would not 
expect honest answers if we did. Instead, on the 
survey, we asked whether family members, friends 
and companies, “… pressure you for favours they 
expect given your work as a councillor”. We also 
asked whether councillors fear violence “against you 
personally because of your position as a councillor”. 
Such questions provide an opportunity for councillors 
to describe the environment in which they work 
without fear of recrimination. 
As shown in Figure 10, while a majority of councillors 
disagree with these statements, only about one third 
strongly disagree. Almost 25% of councillors say that 
friends pressure them. A full 45% of councillors say 
that they fear violence – a quite reasonable fear given 
the extent of violence targeted at councillors, with 
several homicides and home-burnings each year.
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9  Respondents were asked: “How many people rely on you personally to provide the money they need for food, shelter and basic necessities?”
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Figure 10
Family members pressure you for favours 
they expect given your work as a councillor
Friends pressure you for favours they 
expect given your work as a councillor
Local companies pressure you for tenders Your fear violence against you personally 
because of your position as councillor
Across parties, more black councillors say that 
they face pressures than white councillors do. For 
example, holding other factors constant, councillors 
who identify as black are 15 percentage points (8%, 
25%) more likely to agree or strongly agree that 
family members pressure them for favours, and 18 
percentage points (10%, 27%) more likely to agree 
that friends apply pressure, compared with councillors 
of other race groups. By contrast, university-educated 
councillors are less likely to agree that family 
members applied pressure (–10%; –2%, –18%). 
Meanwhile, ANC councillors, ward councillors and 
those in the major urban centres are all more likely 
to agree that companies applied pressure to them, 
while ward and metropolitan councillors are also more 
likely to agree that they feared violence. Meanwhile, 
older councillors generally report facing fewer 
pressures than their younger counterparts (a one 
standard deviation upward shift in age is associated 
with a 4 percentage point (–1%, –8%) decrease in the 
likelihood of agreeing that companies apply pressure, 
and a 5 percentage point (–1%, –8%) decrease in 
the likelihood of fearing violence). Finally, women are 
more likely than men to report fear of violence – being 
female is associated with a 7 percentage point (0%, 
14%) increase in the predicted probability of agreeing 
that they fear violence. 
In sum, those with the most challenging life histories 
are the ones who seem to carry the biggest burdens 
within their local constituencies. This may be largely 
explained by the fact that they live in areas where 
needs are greatest. Owing to South Africa’s history, 
the structure of dependency is profoundly different 
along racial lines. For example, black councillors 
report having 8.2 dependents on average, while white 
councillors report having just 2.3 dependents.9
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Do councillors recognise norms 
of honest government? Are they 
inclined to punish violators?
Finally, we consider norms of honest government set in 
a context where councillors and municipal governments 
have been routinely accused and sometimes convicted 
of corrupt practices. Again, we were concerned about 
the possibility that councillors would not be fully 
truthful when responding to a potentially sensitive 
question, so we created a hypothetical scenario of 
a case of ‘tender fraud’, and asked each councillor 
their views about the most appropriate punishment. 
Specifically, we asked three questions: 
• What do you think the consequences should 
be for L.W.C. [the initials of a hypothetical local 
ward councillor]? (Respondents are provided five 
response options ranging from no punishment to 
maximum punishment.)
• If you had been the one to discover this violation, 
what is the action you most likely would have 
taken? (They are offered several response options, 
as shown in Figure 11.)
• Which of the following best describes your 
views about the current rules for awarding 
tenders? (They are offered five options from 
the elimination of rules to rules should be more 
strict.)
As shown in Figure 11, a majority of councillors 
respond to the first and third questions with the 
‘maximum punishment / most strict’ option, 
reflecting the desirability of seeming ‘tough’ on 
corruption. Nonetheless, a substantial share of 
councillors do not select this option, perhaps 
reflecting beliefs that some aspects of what is 
understood to be ‘fraud’ ought to be treated with a 
lighter touch and that they are not reprehensible in 
the extreme. 
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Figure 11
When a councillor is found to have awarded 
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done if you discovered it?
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Views about punishment divide somewhat predictably 
along party lines, with DA councillors more likely 
to opt for the strictest approach. But individual 
circumstances continue to structure attitudes: among 
sub-sets of ANC and DA councillors (and for the 
entire sample), race and gender are strong predictors 
of attitudes, with black councillors opting for less 
strict approaches than councillors from other race 
groups; female councillors opting for less strict than 
male; and wealthier councillors opting for stricter 
approaches than less wealthy.
While further research is necessary to better 
understand and interpret such findings, one possible 
valid explanation is that views about punishment are 
shaped by the degree to which a councillor may feel 
some empathy with the circumstances that prompt 
individuals to favour friends and family even when it 
means violating the rules and procedures of their job. 
For black councillors, and for those in more difficult 
socio-economic circumstances, they observe (and 
are much more likely to experience) the pressures 
that councillors sometimes face to grant special 
favours, and so may be more inclined to moderate 
their views about punishment. Our point here is not 
to say that any position is right or wrong, but simply 
to clarify that within the ranks of elected officialdom, 
views about important issues of appropriate conduct 
vary in important ways that can be documented 
systematically.
Discussion: Implications for social 
accountability
The specific survey findings presented above provide 
a snapshot of a set of politicians’ views on relevant 
concerns about accountability processes. But what is 
the relevance for a broader understanding of social 
accountability in practice?
To date, most theories and practices of social 
accountability have focused on the articulation 
of what citizens want and need towards some 
undifferentiated corporate or government body. 
Our findings suggest that such approaches should 
take into account the strategic environment in 
which citizen–politician interactions occur, and the 
characteristics of elected representatives. Rather 
than simply waiting for ‘accountability champions’ 
within governments to emerge, citizens ought to 
be more precisely targeting their messages and 
efforts to increase the likelihood of responsiveness 
at the individual politician level. If the goal is action 
and not simply confrontation, theories of social 
accountability require more understanding of the 
people in power.
A useful analogy may be the practice of successful 
marketing both by politicians and companies alike. In 
such cases, the marketing of messages involves the 
deliberate segmentation and customisation of target 
markets: getting into the heads of potential voters and 
consumers to convince them to vote for a particular 
party or candidate, or to buy a particular product. The 
same candy bar, detergent or car, is ‘sold’ to different 
sets of potential consumers in different ways because 
successful companies have come to observe that the 
life experiences of consumers affect how they will 
respond to messages, symbols and prompts to buy 
products.
Can citizens and civil society organisations engage 
in similar practices? That is, can they recognise that 
there may be different ‘markets’ for their needs, and 
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their messages and efforts to increase the likelihood of responsiveness 
at the individual politician level. If the goal is action and not 
simply confrontation, theories of social accountability require more 
understanding of the people in power.
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that being successful (getting what they want) may 
demand a tailoring of messages? For starters, as 
shown clearly in our research, the media channels 
for communication differ along the lines of key 
councillor characteristics. Those same characteristics 
also predict a set of councillor views about how 
government can and should work, let alone specific 
views about particular policy priorities (which we 
have not discussed in this report, but also vary 
systematically in similar ways to those detailed above 
for questions about voice and accountability). 
Our findings also suggest that future campaigns to 
enhance social accountability might benefit from 
greater appreciation of other psychological and 
behavioural insights, including with respect to risk 
aversion (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) and other-
regarding perspectives (e.g. the importance of social 
expectations and recognition; see, for example, 
World Bank 2015). Can politicians be successfully 
‘nudged’ in the same way that citizens are (Thaler 
and Sunstein 2009)? Undoubtedly, the most 
sophisticated of individual and collective actors from 
within society are likely already to practise socially 
attuned strategies. But more general theories and 
practice of social accountability would benefit from 
explicit detailing, systematic theorising and empirical 
testing of such practices. Democratic citizens should 
have the same tools at their disposal as politicians 
and corporate actors.
We leave it to future research and to others to develop 
specific citizen-based strategies that take advantage 
of specific and general insights about politician 
attitudes and behaviours with the goal of attaining 
greater responsiveness and integrity in their work. 
Our larger point is that treating all elected and non-
elected government employees with ‘one size fits all’ 
strategies is likely to be far less effective than one 
that tailors messages in ways that are empathic to a 
diversity of perspectives.
Conclusions
Our analyses of a survey of South African local 
councillors provides some important insights on 
how elected representatives vary in their views 
and attitudes towards accountability processes, 
including the role of citizen input, norms of good 
government and the types of pressures that 
politicians face. Our findings illustrate that, even 
within a polity characterised by strong parties, and 
for which councillors are largely dependent on party 
elites to maintain their jobs (see Lieberman, Martin 
and McMurray 2017), councillors express a range 
of views on important questions about voice and 
accountability in democratic government. 
With respect to certain questions, councillor 
responses do vary systematically along party 
lines; but for many others there is no apparent 
difference in responses by party. Rather, we find 
significant variation within parties, particularly 
across councillors of different socio-economic and 
demographic backgrounds. In particular, gender, age, 
education and wealth explain variation in councillor 
responses. Not surprisingly, race continues to play a 
particularly important role in South African politics 
and governance. While much of the racial variation is 
picked up at the party level (more than 90% of ANC 
and EFF councillors in our sample are black, while 
just 30% of DA councillors are black), even within 
parties, for many questions, race is still a reliable 
predictor of attitudes and behaviours. Importantly, 
in a system in which citizens largely vote for parties 
(even for ward candidates, parties make the choices 
about who will stand for office), representation is 
delivered via individuals, and those individuals’ views 
are a product of their own life experiences.
As stated at the outset, these analyses provide a 
snapshot of elected local councillors in the first 
year of their term. Future research will investigate 
how councillor characteristics and responses in 
turn predict their future behaviours and career 
paths, both at the individual and municipal levels. 
Whether or not citizens’ voices will really ‘count’ in 
local government will surely depend, at least in part, 
on how needs and demands are heard, interpreted 
and processed by such elected representatives and 
leaders. In the meantime, theories and practice of 
social accountability need to pay greater attention to 
elected and non-elected actors as human individuals, 
who are shaped by life histories and the same types of 
cognitive and social biases that seem to constrain just 
about all of us.
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Appendix: South African councillor 
panel study municipalities surveyed 
2017–2018
Key
Metropolitan municipalities
Local municipalities
Not surveyed
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